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V 



Vindications of Patriots 



American Revolution 



JONATHAN TRUMBULL 



JOSEPH GURLEY WOODWARD 



PUBLISHED BY THE 



Connecticut Society of Sons of the American Revolution. 

1896. 






7 



G 



Gift 
Publisher 

6 N'08 




THE DEFAMATION OF REVOLUTION- 
ARY PATRIOTS. 



[Read by Jonathan Trumbull before the Ruth Wyllys Chapter, Daughters of the 
American Revolution, at Hartford, October 31, 1895.] 

In these days, when the history of the American revolution is so 
thoroughly exploited, it behooves the writer whose tendencies are 
iconoclastic to beware of drawing upon his imagination for his facts, 
or of drawing false conclusions from his premises. There appears to 
be an increasing tendency among writers of the day rudely to break 
as many as possible of the images which the Sons and Daughters of 
the American Revolution have been worshipping, which tendency 
would be alarming if all these images were positively known to be 
breakable. It is the purpose of this paper to cite a few instances of 
this same tendency, in the hope that it may be incidentally shown 
that some of the images which have been dashed to earth still remain 
uninjured. 

It is no part of our purpose to impugn the motives of those who are 
interesting themselves in attempts to expose the mistakes and mis- 
deeds of our ancestors of the revolution. It is to be assumed that 
these writers feel that they have a mission to fulfill. If we are, as one 
of the results of this mission, to have the history of the revolution 
shorn of misstatements and cleared from false impressions, let the 
good work go on ! If individual men or parties of men have been 
falsely glorified for a century or more, the sooner their glorification is 
ended, the better. Let justice be done though the heavens fall; let 
us have true history and true biography, even if in having them it 
becomes necessary to hold up every patriot of the revolution to the 
odium of the present enlightened generation! All honor to the histo- 
rian who succeeds in correcting old, or in making new history! But 
no enthusiasm of discovery can excuse the historian who deals care- 
lessly with that most precious possession of the living, and most 
sacred bequest of the dead, personal reputation. 

It is difficult to account for what appears to be just such careless 
dealing on the part of certain writers who must be quoted, except 



upon the supposition that they have established a theory or espoused 
a party, and in their eagerness to sustain the theory or to champion 
the party, they seize upon every real or imaginary indication which 
may strengthen their view of a given case. They appear disposed to 
treat their subjects impartially, but as their statements are usually 
ex parte, they have before them the difficult task of coupling a parti- 
san spirit with an impartial spirit, a union which finds its illustration 
in a certain pair of horses which the owner insisted were well mated 
because one of them was very eager to do all the work and the other 
perfectly willing to allow him to do it. 

Foremost among the parties championed by the modern reformer 
of history are the tories— I beg their pardon — the loj^alists of the rev- 
olution. The enthusiasm of the champions of this unfortunate party 
has become so infectious that it is with some embarrassment that I 
am forced to cite as a rather striking instance the fact that at a meet- 
ing of a certain society of Sons of the American Revolution, it was 
officially reported that an important feature of the work of a branch 
of that society was a discussion which reached the conclusion that 
the tory party was a highly respectable and much villilied one, enti- 
tled to be honored in every way by the descendants of the patriots of 
the revolution. Admitting that the war of the revolution is over, and 
that the tories are as much entitled as any party to their proper place 
in history, it still seems a little strange that such a discussion should 
be regarded with the innocent pride with which it was reported as ap- 
propriate work for a society whose avowed purpose is to honor the 
patriots of the revolution. 

Since this discussion took place in a city less than a hundred miles 
from Hartford, it is but natural to suspect that the process known as 
the contagion of thought may have had something to do with it, and 
that the germs of this contagion may be traced to a chapter on the 
Loyalists in Professor Ferguson's " Essays in American History.''' I 
use the word contagion in a thoroughly Pickwickian sense, fully 
aware that there may be such a thing as wholesome contagion, though 
not fully convinced that the influence in question should be classed 
as such. 

The keynote of these Essays in American History appears to be 
struck in the following words, which the author uses in his preface : 
" . . . . it is a matter for congratulation that at the present 
" day the subject can be treated with greater impartiality and that it 
" is no longer necessary for American writers to make up for the polit- 
" ical and literary insignificance of their country by boasting either 
" of the vastness of their continent or of the Spartan virtue of their 
" ancestors." 

It is no part of our purpose to discuss the existence, at any time 
in our country's history, of such a dire necessity as that which Pro- 



fessor Ferguson points out; and it is not necessary to discuss the 
conclusions he reaches regarding the loyalists, of whose social, moral 
and political position he gives us a glowing account in a very able 
ex parte statement. Quite probably he is correct in the conclusion 
that as a class they were men of greater wealth and higher social 
position than the rank and file of the patriots. There is no doubt 
that they were unfortunate, that their services were never duly com- 
pensated by the British, and that they were not treated by the 
patriots with that careful consideration for their personal comfort 
and respect for their political views which it is to be inferred should, 
under some unknown code of military usage, be accorded by bellig- 
erents to the most dangerous of enemies, internal foes in time of 
war. 

In the course of this special pleading in behalf of the tories, it is 
not to be expected that their champion will accord very favorable 
treatment to their enemies, and our expectations in this respect have 
not misled us. As we read the epithet " so-called patriots " applied 
to the men of Massachusetts in the earljr stages of the history of the 
struggle, we are inclined to enter a modest protest, as in other similar 
instances. But we must remember that it is with the historical 
accurac}' of certain statements regarding the patriots that we have 
to deal, and to that let us turn our attention. 

In the mention made of the patriots of Massachusetts during the 
long period preceding the outbreak of the war, we read, " . . . the 
" cause of American rights was disgraced, year after year, by riots, 
" murder (the italics are my own), arson and sedition." The charge 
of murder occurring annually is a serious one, even in times of such 
political agitation and provocation to violence as those referred to. 
In answer to this charge it is only necessary to ask the accuser to 
point to a single instance of murder, or even of bloodshed which can 
be laid to the charge of the patriots during the time and in the place 
referred to. It is a remarkable fact that when her citizens were shot 
down by British soldiers in the streets of Boston, no retaliation in 
kind should have occurred; so remarkable that we can only infer 
that they are accused of murder on general principles; but until we 
see proof to the contrary we must insist that this charge is unknown 
to history. 

We now come to the treatment of the patriots in this essay as com- 
pared with the tories in the matter of raids on defenseless towns, and 
illegitimate warfare in general. Another question of historical accu- 
racy arises when we read these words : 

"But it is an undoubted fact that there were outrages on both 
sides, bad treatment of prisoners on both sides, guerrilla warfare with 
all its evil concomitants on both sides, and in these respects the 
tories were no worse than the whigs." 



6 

Admitting that a statement of this kind cannot be proved or 
disproved by any of the fundamental rules of arithmetic, I believe 
its inaccuracy to be susceptible of proof to any intelligent and 
disinterested jury hearing all the evidence. It is a significant fact 
that, in summing up this evidence only the single event of Sullivan's 
campaign through the Indian country is cited by the author as a par- 
allel to the massacres of Cherry Valley, Wyoming, Groton Heights, 
and the wanton attacks on the defenseless towns of Danbury, Ridge- 
field, New Haven, Norwalk, Fairfield in our own state, Falmouth in 
Maine, and Portsmouth and Norfolk in Virginia. The injustice of such 
a comparison is evident. Sullivan's campaign through the Indian 
country was a military necessity, and served as a wholesome preven- 
tive of a repetition of such unspeakable horrors as the Cherry Valley 
massacre, which, unless prevented by just such vigorous measures as 
Sullivan employed would have resulted in adding similar instances 
to the long score against the tories. No such reason can be assigned 
for any one of the barbarous raids by the British which I have 
enumerated. To no one of these horrors can be assigned a legiti- 
mate purpose of civilized warfare. They can be traced to no motive 
which could justify, excuse or palliate them as militarj^ advantages 
of any consequence whatever. A significant comparison might be 
made in this connection between the captui'e of Stony Point by the 
gallant Anthony Wayne, and the capture of Groton Heights by the 
forces under Arnold. In the brilliant engagement which resulted in 
the capture of Stony Point, not a man was killed except in the thick 
of the fight, though the laws of European warfare at the time would 
have justified the butchery of the entire garrison, and the knowledge 
of the barbarous proceedings in Virginia was fresh in the minds of 
the patriots. With this example before them, we all know how the 
British proceeded two years later at Groton, where the gallant Led- 
yard was slain by the sword he surrendered, and no quarter was 
given his heroic band. 

But we must resist the temptation to make further comparisons. 
Up to this point the score against the tories is a long one, and it is in 
no way shortened by the additional comparisons which the author 
makes, offering as he does a Cowboy as an equivalent for a Skinner, 
and Marion and Sumter as equivalents for Ferguson and Simcoe, 
without citing any instances of the doings of either. If a parallel 
could be found in the warfare of the sturdy Sumter and the chival- 
rous Marion for the massacre of fifty of the men of Pulaski's legion 
by the forces in command of Ferguson, the score against the tories 
would be in no way reduced; and in this condition we will leave it. 
It must be remarked, however, that it is just a little strange that, as 
an additional argument in defense of the tories in this connection, 
these words should be used : 



" The Americans, however, do not deserve any credit for abstain- 
" ing from the use of Indian allies. They tried very hard to make 
" use of them, but without success." 

It is diflficult to determine the precise bearing of this remark upon 
the subject. It would seem that it appears necessary, after roundly 
denouncing the patriots for what they did, to appeal to the imagina- 
tion for what they might have done had they had the opportunity. 
We are, perhaps, expected to pursue a course of argument which 
once involved even the genius of Mark Twain in a hopeless tangle of 
difficulties by proceeding upon the postulate that "the intention, not 
the act, constitutes the crime, hence constitutes the deed." In fear 
of similar consequences, we will drop this portion of the argument, 
if it is an argument. 

Another unproved statement which we may safely challenge is in 
reference to the town committees in their dealings with the tories, 
where we read that ' ' they proceeded on principles of evidence which 
would have shocked and scandalized a grand inquisitor." We have 
heard, perhaps, of an historical parallel between Hannibal and 
Annie Laurie, but never before, I imagine, of a comparison between 
a grand inquisitor and a revolutionary patriot, in which the grand 
inquisitor shines, by contrast, as a pattern of administrative justice. 
The question is, how does he do it? And this question can only be 
appropriately answered by the accuser of the patriot. 

These few instances of the treatment of the patriots by this 
author are all that can be submitted within the present limits. They 
have been chosen as illustrations of the defamation of the patriots of 
the revolution, not from any belief that their author would know- 
ingly or wilfully do injustice to such men, but from the belief that, in 
arguing the case of the royalists, he has very naturally published 
mistaken views regarding their opponents. 

What the distinguished historian, John Fiske, has done in a lecture 
none too long, yet occupying an hour and a half in deliver}', I shall 
quite certainly not attempt to do in the few minutes which can be 
devoted to Professor Peabody's article on "Boston Mobs before the 
Revolution" in the Atlantic Mo7ithly, for September, 1888. This 
article enumerates the "Boston tea-party " among these mobs, giving 
that historic event a distinction, with but little, if any difference, from 
the disgraceful riot which resulted in the sacking of Goveror Hutchin- 
son's residence. Fiske treats the subject quite exhaustively in his 
own inimitable way, showing conclusively that the Boston tea-party 
was the last resort of determined, intelligent and respectable men, 
who had exhausted every other means of asserting their rights. This 
lecture, like all of Fiske's writings, has, no doubt, found a permanent 
place in the historical literature of our country, so that it is only 
necessary to refer to it as a most able correction of a false conclusion 



8 

of Professor Peabody's, entirely unwarranted by the political situa- 
tion and by the facts in the case. It must be insisted that the result 
of this false conclusion is to defame the patriots of the revolution in 
their connection with the Boston tea-party, which result has been 
ably and happily frustrated by the scholarly treatment which Fiske 
has given it. It should be noted in passing, that Professor Peabody 
develops an admiration for the tories, which, together with his out- 
spoken protest against a monument to Crispus Attucks, gives his 
short treatise a bias which produces the usual result of defeating 
impartial treatment of his subject. 

Probably no one of the thirteen original states was as active, alert 
and efficient in the restraint of tories during the war as our own state 
of Connecticut. In this the intelligence of our legislation was shown, 
as in the liberal treatment accorded to the tories after the conclusion 
of the war, as has been ably shown in Professor Ferguson's essay on 
the loyalists. No sooner did Ralph Isaacs, for example, send "some 
fine blackfish to Governor Brown," or some tea and other luxuries to 
Governor Franklin, both of whom were confined at Middletown, than 
the fact was reported to the general assembly, and after a hearing 
in which, perhaps, the principles of evidence "would have shocked 
and scandalized a grand inquisitor," Mr. Isaac's case received care- 
ful treatment. Not only did Connecticut effectively restrain internal 
enemies within her own borders, but received them, to be cared for, 
from other states less competent to provide for them, as in the case 
of Governor Franklin of New Jersey. Can it be possible that, during 
the entire period of the revolution, such a state as Connecticut could 
have maintained a tory in a high and responsible official position 
affording him peculiar facilities for acquainting himself with the pro- 
ceedings and military movements of the state ? If certain sources of 
information which ought to be authoritative are correct, this is pre- 
cisely what Connecticut did. Turning to Appleton's Eiicyclopcedia 
of Americajt Bio^^rraphy, vender the name George Wyllys, and ap- 
pended to his remarkable record of sixty-four years' service as secre- 
tary of state, we read : 

" Notwithstanding that he was in active sympathy with the loyalist 
element during the revolution, his tenure of office was not inter- 
rupted." 

This statement is evidently taken from Dexter' s Yale Biographies, 
where it appears in almost identical language, unaccompanied by 
any reference to authorities. 

This being the case, the statement should not remain anj-^ longer 
unchallenged. Allow me to suggest that the Ruth Wyllys Chapter 
of Daughters of the American Revolution should appoint a committee 
to wait upon Professor Dexter, and insist upon proof that the father- 
in-law of this chapter's patron saint was a tory who was base enough to 



act in the service and receive the pay of his enemies during the entire 
war. This question is of such importance as a matter of Connecticut 
history, affecting the record of the state, and, as it now stands, blot- 
ting the fair fame of George Wyllys, that no time should be lost in 
bringing it to final proof or disproof. 

It may be added that the evidence thus far points to disproof of 
this surprising statement. Dr. Charles J. Hoadly, to whom I am 
indebted for calling my attention to this statement, finds, among the 
wealth of historical resources at his command, no shadow of proof of 
the toryism of George Wyllys. And even Miss Talcott, who has 
made a special study of the Wyllys family, resulting in the admirable 
paper which the Ruth Wyllys Chapter has published, finds no indi- 
cation which points, in the slightest degree, to a suspicion of the 
patriotism and rectitude of George Wyllys. 

Up to this point in our investigations we find that, if we leave the 
patriots of the revolution to the tender mercies of some members of 
the faculties of our higher institutions of learning, the patriots will 
receive rather rough treatment at the hands of these gentlemen. Let 
us hope, however, that notwithstanding the views and statements 
emanating from members of the faculties of Trinity, Harvard and 
Yale, we may still number a few friends of the patriots among those 
who have charge of the training of our young men, even in these 
institutions; and especially let us hope that such of these young men 
as are descendants of patriots of the revolution may not learn at these 
institutions to deride or utterly despise their ancestors. 

The most recent and the final specimen which is to be exhibited is 
one which I must apologize for introducing, owing to the personal 
interest which attaches to it. It forms, however, an example so 
striking of the treatment of the patriots by a writer of the day, 
and is of such interest as a matter of Connecticut history, that, 
while it particularly interests a descendant of the accused, it can 
hardly fail to attract the attention of the Connecticut Daughters and 
Sons of the American Revolution as well. 

Mr. Paul L. Ford, the accuser in this instance, is well known as a 
compiler of American documentary history and as the author of a 
recent novel which deserves the highest commendation from all who 
feel a pride in the distinctively American fiction of the day. By this 
I do not mean to intimate that he has mistakenly adopted a 
romancer's license in treating of the historical subject we are about 
to consider. I am only impressed with the belief that he has, in this 
instance, drawn a false conclusion from his premises. In the 
Atlantic Monthly for last May, Mr. Ford contributed a paper on the 
intrigues of Benjamin Rush in his attacks on Washington at the time 
of the Conway cabal, and, apropos of these intrigues and other 
attacks on Washington, says : 



lO 

" Yet not merely have these been forgotten, but the very descend- 
ants of the men who were bitterest in their attacks upon him have 
most carefully avoided reviving the facts, and have actually taken 
every means in their power to suppress and destroy all proofs of 
such antagonism. As an instance of this, the biographies of Samuel 
and John Adams, of Elbridge Gerry, of Jonathan and John Trumbull, 
and of Richard Henry Lee, as well as such materials as exist con- 
cerning James Lovell, William Williams, Daniel Roberdeau, and 
Francis Lightfoot Lee, are either silent or absolutely deny that these 
several men were concerned in the attempt to remove Washington 
from the command of the armj'^ at one of the most critical moments 
of the revolution." 

Once more I must apologize for selecting from this formidable list 
only the names of those in whom I have a personal interest. The 
rather sweeping assertion of Mr. Ford regarding their descendants 
places me in a position where a word of personal explanation is 
needed from me as a lineal descendant of one of the accused, a col- 
lateral descendant of another, and a relative by marriage of a third. 
I can only say that, never having had the facts, or any trace of the 
facts, regarding the connection of these men with the Conway cabal, 
in my possession, and that never having had any knowledge of the 
existence of these facts, it has been impossible for me to avoid reviv- 
ing them, or to suppress them, or to destroy any proof of them. All 
of which has been submitted to Mr. Ford, with the assurance that I 
would not, knowingly, spoil even a joke, much less spoil history, for 
relationship's sake, and with the request that he would direct me to 
sources of information which show that Jonathan Trumbull, his son 
John, and his son-in-law, William Williams, were concerned in an 
" attempt to remove Washington from the command of the army at 
one of the most critical moments of the revolution." 

To this inquiry I have the following reply: 

" The Conway cabal drew into it men of very diverse views, and 
even some who later supported Washington. The TrumbuUs fell 
into that party from two, if not more motives, the first being intense 
dislike and jealousy of Schuyler and the New York influence gen- 
erally; the second, disapproval of Washington's demand for a three 
years' army, the New England feeling being for a Continental enlist- 
ment annually, and a main reliance on militia rather than on a regu- 
lar army. They were also affronted by the treatment of Joseph Trum- 
bull, and used his criticisms of St. Clair as a means for removing 
Schuyler. I have never been able to unearth William Williams' mo- 
tives, but presume it was his relationship with the Trumbulls, as well 
as his New England tinge." 



II 

This is, of course, interesting, but it assumes a knowledge on the 
part of the reader of facts of which he has no knowledge at all, that 
is to say, facts that show that these men, by any known acts of theirs, 
were in any way connected with the miserable intrigue. It is one 
thing to say that they were surrounded by certain influences, but it 
is quite another thing to prove that they yielded to those influences. 
Further inquiries for proofs meeting with no response from Mr. Ford, 
I have consulted the best authorities at mj' command, but find no 
indication that any of these men were connected with the Conway 
cabal. The official correspondence of Governor Trumbull with Gen- 
eral Schuyler makes free mention of the feeling of New England 
soldiers engaged in the Northern campaign of 1777, with expressions 
of deep regret on the part of the governor that such feeling should 
exist, and assurances that no effort should be spared on his part to 
overcome it. Indeed, if Governor Trumbull cherished an "intense 
jealousy and dislike of Schuyler," the correspondence lays Trumbull 
open to the charge of hypocrisy, as an instance of which, let me quote 
a few words from one of his letters to Schuyler: 

"That you have sent to congress a resignation of your command, 
that you are obliged to vindicate your character by publishing a nar- 
rative of your conduct, are matters that I can hear of but with deep 
concern. I make no doubt of your ability to justify yourself, yet fear 
the consequences of such an appeal, at this time especially. I wish 
to see your character stand as fair with the world as it does with me, 
but cannot wish that congress should accept your resignation, that 
your ability and zeal should be lost to the country when she most 
needs them. . . ." 

From the correspondence of Washington and Trumbull at this 
time, no indication of any abatement either of personal regard on the 
part of Trumbull, or of any intention to do otherwise than to assist 
him most effectively, can be found. 

It is hardly necessary to repeat, in substance, similar absence of 
proof in the case of Col. John Trumbull. At the time of the Con- 
way cabal, he was a young, ambitious man of twenty-one, possessed 
of a certain self-assertiveness, not to say self-conceit, which is by no 
means uncommon, even to-day, in young men of that age. I cannot 
forgive him for resigning and returning his commission at about this 
time because its date did not suit his notions of military courtesy, 
any more than I can forgive his father for joining with the president 
of Harvard College in trying to dissuade him from pursuing the 
career of an artist, unless the shrewd old gentleman considered at 
the time that his son's character was such that opposition would only 
strengthen his adherence to a given course of action. But we need 
some more substantial proof of his connection with the Conway cabal 



12 

than the fact that he resigned his commission as he did, or even that 
the sycophantic Gates wrote in his fulsome way to the governor allud- 
ing to his son's resignation as a loss sustained by him (Gates) in hav- 
ing him "torn from his friend," meaning himself. 

On the whole, such investigations as I have been able to make of 
statements derogatory to the characters of men who have hitherto 
been regarded as the patriots of the revolution, lead me to believe 
that such statements may always be regarded with suspicion, and 
that they will seldom, if ever, bear the tests to which they should be 
subjected. It may be that the Sons and Daughters of the American 
Revolution are introducing into this country a mythology of a new 
kind; but I confess I incline to Carlyle's opinion that we do not see 
enough of hero worship of the right kind. It is certainly infinitely 
better than mammon worship or self worship, and will result in a 
race of sturdier patriots than we can derive from any other source; 
certainly sturdier and more wholesome than a race which devotes 
itself to a buzzard-like search for the unsavory things of American 
history. 





AN EXAMINATION OF THE CHARGE 
OF TREASON AGAINST GENERAL 
SAMUEL HOLDEN PARSONS. 



Read before the Connecticut Historical Society, May 5, 1896, 
By JOSEPH GURLEY WOODWARD. 

In Winsor's admirable Narrative and Critical History of Am eric a , 
a note attached to the account of the trial of Andre is as follows : 
" It is only within a few years, and since the publication of Clinton's 
Record of the Secret Service of Headquarters, that it has been 
known that Gen. S. H. Parsons, of Connecticut, was at this time (the 
time of trial of Andre) acting as a spy for the British general. 
Andre, who saw him in the court, maj'^ have known this."* 

A careless yielding to the temptation to set forth a highly dramatic 
situation has led the author of this note not only to accept the guilt 
of Parsons as fully established, but into a serious chronologic blunder 
also, about which there can be no question whatever. There was no 
traitor upon the bench of the court, while a relatively innocent man, 
possessed of a knowledge of the guilt of his judge, was tried for his 
life. For the trial of Andre took place in 1780, and the only evidence 
against Parsons, the secret service record of Sir Henry Clinton, 
shows that his treasonable correspondence, if he was guilty, began 
in 1781, the following year. 

To state in full the evidence against General Parsons, and to weigh 
it, is the purpose of this paper. 

The Rev. Jonathan Parsons, the father of the general, was the 
grandson of Deacon Benjamin Parsons, a settler at Springfield in 
1636. He was the minister of the church at Lyme, Connecticut, from 
1 73 1 to 1745. When Whitefield came to Connecticut he became one 
of his most ardent supporters and himself went on a preaching tour 
and held revival meetings. His course so scandalized a part of his 
congregation that he was compelled to resign. He went to New- 



*Vol. vi, p. 460. 



H 

buryport, Massachusetts, where, j-ears after, Whitefield died at his 
house. The Rev. Jonathan Parsons married Phoebe Griswold, a 
sister of Governor Matthew Griswold and a descendant of Henry 
Wolcott, of Windsor, the founder of the most illustrious family of 
Connecticut. From this union sprang Samuel Holden Parsons, in- 
heriting on the one side a tendency toward fervid radicalism, and on 
the other qualities which make for natural leadership among men. 
He was bom at Lyme, May 14, 1737, graduated at Harvard in 175O, 
studied law in the office of his uncle, Matthew Griswold, and was 
admitted to the bar in 1759. He was chosen a deputy to the general 
assembly from Lyme in 1762, and re-elected annually until his re- 
moval to New London in 1774. He was appointed by the general 
assembly a member of the revolutionary committee of correspond- 
ence in 1773; and in that year he wrote a letter to Samuel Adams 
suggesting a Continental Congress, in which he said : " The idea of 
inalienable allegiance to any prince or state is an idea to me inad- 
missable; and I cannot see but that our ancestors, when they first 
landed in America, were as independent of the crown or king of 
Great Britain as if they had never been his subjects."* He was 
appointed king's attorney in 1773, but on the outbreak of hostilities 
he resigned the office with its emoluments. To the Boston commit- 
tee of defense, he wrote in 1774 : " We consider the cause the com- 
mon cause of all the colonies, and doubt not the concurrence of all to 
defend and support you. Let us play the man for the cause of our 
country, and trust the event to Him who orders all events for the 
best good of His people." f 

He early took an interest in military affairs, and was major of the 
Third regiment in 1770, lieutenant-colonel in 1774, and colonel in 

1775- 

When New England was startled by the shots fired at Lexington, 
he set out for the scene of the conflict at the head of a company from 
New London. Later, on the way to Hartford, where he arrived 
April 27, 1775, he fell in with Benedict Arnold, who gave him an 
account of the state of affairs at Ticonderoga, and of the great 
number of brass cannon there. With Col. Samuel Wyllys and Silas 
Deane, he formed a project for taking the fort. Joined by three 
others, they borrowed money from the colonial treasury on their 
individual obligations for fitting out the expedition, which, under 
command of Ethan Allen, surprised and captiired the fort on the 
morning of the loth of May. X He participated in the battle of Long 
Island in command of a brigade, and was made a brigadier-general 



* Magazine of A merican History, January, 1889. 

+ Magazine 0/ American History, vol. xxi. 

$ Collections Connecticut Historical Society, vol. i, p. r8i. 



15 

for gallant service. He was also at Harlem Heights and at White 
Plains and with Washington in New Jersey. In 177S-9 he com- 
manded the troops in the Highlands. In 1778 General Tryon ad- 
dressed him as a "revolted subject of Great Britain," to which 
Parsons responded, " A justifiable resistance against unwarrantable 
invasions of the natural and social rights of mankind, if unsuccessful, 
according to the fashion of the world, will be termed rebellion, but if 
successful, will be deemed a noble struggle for the defense of every- 
thing valuable in life. Whether I am considered as a revolted sub- 
ject of the king of Great Britain, or in any other light by his subjects, 
is very immaterial, and gives me little concern. Future ages, I hope, 
will do justice to my intentions, and the present to the humanity of 
my conduct."* 

He was one of the board before which Andre was brought in 1780. 
In the same year he was made a major-general and succeeded to 
Putnam's command. A successful attack upon the enemy near New 
York won for him the thanks of congress February 5, 1781. 

From the fight at Lexington until the war was practically con- 
cluded by the surrender of Cornwallis he was continually in service. 
He resigned from the army in 1782 and entered upon the practice of 
law at Middletown. In 1785 he was appointed a commissioner to 
treat with the Miami Indians. He was an active member of the con- 
vention which ratified the constitution in 1788, and in the same year 
was appointed the first judge of the northwest territory. In 1789 he 
was one of a commission appointed to treat with the Wyandottes for 
their rights to the Connecticut Western Reserve. While returning 
to his home at Marietta from a meeting with Wyandotte chiefs, he 
was drowned in the rapids of the Big Beaver, November 17, 17S9. 

Hinman says: " He filled various places of great trust and impor- 
tance at different periods of his life, the duties of which he dis- 
charged with acknowledged ability and fidelity." 

Senator George F. Hoar, in his centennial oration at Marietta in 
188S, spoke of him as "soldier, scholar, judge, one of the strongest 
arms on which Washington leaned, who first suggested the continen- 
tal congress, from the story of whose life could almost be written the 
story of the northern war." This brief sketch of the man against 
whom the charge of treason has been brought shows him to have 
been "an early and a wise and a resolute patriot," f who did not 
shrink from pecuniary sacrifice, or hesitate to incur the dangers of 
the field for his country's sake. His employments in the public 
service when the war was done prove that he had won the respect 
and confidence of his fellowmen. 

* Magazine of American History y vol. xxi. 

i Bancroft'' s History of the U. i",, vol. vi, p. 2S;. 

2 



i6 

A manuscript volume— /J Record of Private Intelligence — kept at 
the headquarters of Sir Henry Clinton when he was in command at 
New York and which came down in his family, was brought to light 
at an auction sale in 1882, and passed into the possession of Thomas 
Addis Emmett of New York. The record begins January 20, 17S1, 
and extends to the following July. It contains mainly information 
derived from spies and secret agents. Its contents, edited with care 
and learning by Edward F. DeLancey, were printed a dozen years 
ago in the Magazine of American History. The entries which 
refer to General Parsons follow. 

* March 11, 1781, "Mr. H. says General Parsons' aid-de-Camp, 
whose name is Lawrence f is soliciting leave to come in to see his 
mother. He thmks it is in our power to tamper with him and that 
from Parsons' mercenary disposition there is little doubt of success." 

24th April, 1 78 1. 

X Sir— The business I had to negotiate with Gen'l P s, after my 

return home, I paid the utmost attention to, and in order to break 
the ice (as says the vulgar adage) I found myself under the necessity 
of summoning what little address I was master of, in order to 
secure myself a retreat, should the matter I had to propose prove 

disagreeable to P s. Therefore after giving him a satisfactory 

account of my commercial negotiation (which I knew would be 
alluring to him) I introduced the other branch of my business in 
the following manner. I told him that in justice to the confidence 
he reposed in me, I conceived myself in duty bound to conceal no 
material circumstance from him which may in any respect affect 
him. Impressed with this sense I begged leave to communicate the 
substance of a conversation I had with a gentleman at New York, 
whom I knew to be in the highest confidence with the commander- 
in-chief. This gentleman, I told him, hearing of my being in town 
with a flag and knowing I had many friends in it, who, notwith- 
standing our differing in political sentiments, were attached to me, 
he therefore made use of some of them to acquaint me that he 
wished for an interview for the purpose of conferring on a subject 
the nature of which was in no way inconsistent with strict honor. I 
accordingly waited on him at the appointed hour when a conversa- 
tion of the following import occurred: 

"I understand," said the gentleman, "that you are intimately 

acquainted with G Par— s." I answered in the affirmative. 

"Don't you judge him to be a gentleman possessed of too much 



* Magazine of A merican History, vol. .x, p. 503 . 

t Lieut. Oliver Lawrence of Lamb's artillery was detailed as an aid to General Par 
sons and paid as such by Connecticut. He was of a Long Island family. 
% Magazine of American History, vol. xi, p. 62. 



17 

understanding and liberality of sentiment to think that the welfare 
of his country consists in an unnatural alliance with the Enemies to 
the Protestant religion, a perfidious nation, with whom no faith can 
be long kept, as all the nations of Europe have experienced?" I 
answered that I knew G — 1 P — s to be a Gentleman of abilities, but 
could not judge of his feelings toward that nation, otherwise than by 
observing no great cordiality subsisting between him and the gentry 
of that nation, in our service. "The terms offered by the parent 
state," continued the gentleman, " are so liberal and generous, that I 
wonder at any gentleman of an enlarged and liberal mind giving his 
assistance in prolonging the calamities of his Country, and as General 
P — s is well known to possess these talents as well as great influence 
in the army and country, Government would wish to make use of him 
for the laudable and honorable purpose of lending his aid in termin- 
ating this unhappy war in an amicable Reunion with the parent State; 
should he undertake it. Government will amply reward him, both in 
a lucrative and honorary way and manner — "besides," I super-added, 
"making a provision for his son." Thus, Sir, have I been necessitated 
to use all this circumlocution in order to convince him of the delicacy 
observed in making the above propositions, and that nothing was in- 
tended inconsistent with the purest principles of honor. 

During this conversation I observed that he listened with uncom- 
mon attention, and as it grew very late, he said it was a matter 
which required deliberation; he therefore postponed it to another 
opportunity. 

Next morning he sent for me and resumed the subject of our last 
or preceding night's discourse. He said he had weighed the matter 
and found himself, upon the strictest examination, disposed to a 
reconciliation and to effect which he would use his influence and lend 
his aid to promote it, but that he saw the embarrassments in his way 
in regard to inculcating such principles in the army, though he did 
not doubt but in time he could bring the officers of the Connecticut 
line over to his opinion. That in order to effect it he thought he 
could do it more to the purpose by resigning his Commission, which 
would save every appearance of those honorary ideas, inseparable 
from the military profession; that he would draw after him the 
officers above referred to, who look up to him as a father, and that 
their joint influence would be exerted among the citizens, which 
would turn the tables in favor of Government in our State, but in 
consideration of those services, he must have a reasonable and meet 
compensation for his commission, it being all he had to depend 
upon. 

Thus, Sir, have I given you a faithful account of this business and 
shall wait on you for your further direction at any hour you may 
please to appoint, when I may have the honor of relating other cir- 



i8 

cumstances relative to it, which would be rather tedious to commit to 
writing. I shall be in a situation this summer (I hope) to render 
essential service, having carried my election against Judge Sanford, 
who is one of the first families in the place. It is needless to observe 
that in the general assembly of Connecticut, enter all the material 
concerns of our political system; that secret advices from Congress, 
from Washington, and from abroad, are there canvassed, the early 
knowledge of which may be of consequence in order to avail your- 
self of it. I am, etc. ys, 

W. K4 
To Major DeLancey, &c., &c. 

25th April, 1781. 

* Memorandums taken of a conversation with Hiram. § 

He promises to get from General Pa— s the following information: 

The exact state of West Point. 

What Troops. 

What Magazines. 

What new Works and how many Guns. 

Who commands. 

If there is a boom below Fort Clinton. 

He is to let me know what P — s' wish is, how we can serve him 
and the methods he means to point out himself. He is to tell him 
he can no way serve us so well as continuing in the army; that the 
higher his command, the more material service he can render. He 
is to promise him great rewards for any services he may do us. He 
is to hold up the idea of Monk to him, and that we expect from his 
services an end to the War. That during the time he continues in 
their army he shall have a handsome support, and should he be 
obliged to fly, to remind him of the Example and situation of Arnold. 
I am to hear from him on Friday next, when he will let me know how 
far he has operated on Pa— s. I shall tell him further what steps to 
take. He is to go to Hartford and attend the Assembly, from whence 
he will collect minutes, and in the month of June will transmit them 
to the General. He makes no doubt of bringing Par— s to do what 

we wish. 

New York, Sunday, 17th June, 1781. 

f Sir— Being somewhat recovered from the fatiguing riding last 

night till 12 o'clock, I sit down to give you the heads only (to avoid 

prolixity) of such matters as have fallen within my observation since 

I had the pleasure of seeing you last. Soon after my return home, I 

prepared dispatches for you and left them at the appointed place, 

and I find they are taken away, but whether by Bulkley, or any other 



* Magazine o/ American History, vol. xi, p. 64. 
^Magazine 0/ American History^ vol. xi. p. 254. 
X William Heron. 
§ William Heron. 



^9 

person, I know not. They contained amongst other matters an 
account of the intended route of the French troops, the place of their 
destination and the ground on which they were to encamp Like- 
wise an account of the state of West Point and its dependencies. 

This early notice I had from G 1 P s, who had it from the 

French officers who had been viewing the place of encampment. 
A few days afterwards (i. e.) the Sth ult. : I set out for Hartford 
where I attended the Assembly, and left it the week before last, in 
order to give you the earliest account of those matters, which deserve 

attention. Letters of G 1 Washington of the loth and 12th ult.: 

addressed to the Governor and Assembly, were laid before the house 
on the 14th, same month; setting forth the deplorable state of the 
troops at West Point and its dependencies, for want of Provisions; 
subsisting several days on half allowance, and at last reduced to 
quarter allowance. The daily issues to the army, and its fol- 
lowers, were 8000 Rations. Gen'l Heath, who brought the dis- 
patches, and was sent to the Eastern States in order to urge them 
to a sense of their danger, declared before the Assembly, the Gar- 
rison at West Point must inevitably fall. At that critical moment, 
Sir, I found myself in need of a Confidential friend out of doors 
who could be improved for the purpose of conveying hither this 
state of facts; but it being early in the session, I dare not leave my 
Post. The Assembly ordered a scanty supply of Provisions imme- 
diately and I believe they have but a bare supply from day to day 
ever since. You doubtless know that Washington and the French 
officers from Newport hold a Convention at Wethersfield on the 19th 
ult. for the purpose of settling the plan of operations for the ensuing 
Campaign. On the 24th, when the Convention arose, we had a long 
letter from Gen'l Washington read in the House, containing the 
result of their deliberations, at Wethersfield, the substance of which 
is this : — The French troops he says are to march from Newport to 
Hudson's River as soon as circumstances will admit (meaning the 
article of forrage; Land Carriage, &c.) and begs that the French agent 
may be assisted in making the necessary preparations for their 
accommodation in the several towns through which they were to 
march. He adds that it is the opinion of the most experienced 
French and American officers that this is the time for availing them- 
selves of the weakness of the enemy at New York. The constant 
draining of troops from that garrison to the Southern States invites 
us (he says) to improve the critical moment. Our allies here expect 
our most vigorous exertions in co-operating with them, and our allies 
in Europe will be astonished at our supineness and inactivity should 
we not improve this favorable opportunity. Therefore in order to 
carry our plan of operations into complete execution it is agreed that 
a number not less than the quota of troops of every State from New 



20 

Hampshire to New Jersey inclusive will answer any good purpose; 
(the Quotas here referred to, are those which Congress apportioned to 
the several States for the continental establishment, the exact num- 
ber of which I have formerly sent by Pa n) and that they must be 

completed by the ist day of July, independent of the militia, 1500 of 
which is demanded of Connecticut, and to be held in readiness to join 
the main army within a week after they are called for. 

That every assistance must be afforded the Q"" Mast. Gen'l in order 
to enable him to forward stores, etc. — That a quantity of Powder 
must be immediately furnished. — That the raising of Volunteers 
must be encouraged. — That if the Continental line cannot be filled up 
by the ist July with three years men, peremptory detachments from 
the militia must be made to serve till December next. Finally, 
should he not be properly supported, the consequences must prove 
fatal, as in that case the Enemy will overrun the Northern States — 
and by that means draw resources from thence to garrison New 
York, which will enable them to baffle all our future attempts; there- 
fore he insists upon an explicit answer, and wishes to know what he 
may depend on. Should his requisitions be not complied with, he 
must act on the defensive only. He complains loudly of their want 
of energy, of their tardiness in filling up their respective quotas of 
troops, and of their backwardness in paying the army; they (mean- 
ing the States) being eighteen months in arrears with them. The 
foregoing matters were taken up by the Assembly and several days 
spent in debate, and never was an Assembly in Connecticut since the 
commencement of the Rebellion so embarrassed as the present, 
owing to their loss of public credit, the want of means to carry on 
the war, and the depreciation of the paper currency, this last being 
the source whence proceeded every public evil. Nevertheless, it was 
violently urged by a powerful party to emit a new bank of paper 
currency and to make it a tender, without which they thought it 
impossible to carry on the war: All their prospects of loaning specie 
having failed. However, this was overruled by a majority, and they 
finally passed a Vote to tax in specie, and in specific articles of prod- 
uce, so that paper money is totally done with. I have at home an 
estimate of the expenses of the current year, which is about 19,000,- 
000 dollars in specie. This I dare not bring with me, but shall for- 
ward at a more safe opportunity. The French troops are now on 
their march and will reach Crumpond (where they are to encamp) in 
about ten days. G — 1 P — s assisted me in coming here now. We 
concerted measures for our future conduct with regard to conveying 
such intelligence as may come to his knowledge. I find him disposed 
to go some lengths (as the phrase is) to serve you, and even going 
thus far is gaining a great deal. But I, who am ever jealous of in- 
triguing persons, especially in this cause, fearing the measures 



21 

calculated to promote the interest of Government may be frustrated 
or thwarted by them, and myself made an instrument of fraud in a 
cause, for the support of -which I have hazarded everything, have 
therefore exerted all the perspicacity I am master of, to annalize [so 
in the MS.) the Gentleman in Question and find he will not at present 
explicitly say that he will go such lengths as I could wish. I know 
the scruples he has to struggle with, those of education, family con- 
nections and mihtary ideas of honor. But interest, together with the 
prejudices now subsisting between the army and State, rather than 
principle, may overcome these. Thus have I dealt with you with 
faithfulness and sincerity (as I think it my duty) and leave the 
improvement of the foregoing hints to your own superior judgment. 

Meantime I remain, Sir, 

Yr most Ob't & Very H"' Serv't, 

Major De Lancey. 

* Questions by Major DeLancey to Hiram and his answers given 
2oth June, 1781. 

QUESTIONS. 

ist. Is it your opinion that Gen'l P s will enter so heartily as to 

make us hope he will take an open, determined step in our favor? 
Should that be the case you can hold up the situation of General 
Arnold and say it is in his power to place himself in one equally con- 
spicuous; and as he must lose his present property for a time, the 
f C. in C. will, for every man he puts in our possession pay three 
guineas; or should he choose it, he will specify the sum that shall be 
paid on such an event as we shall wish taking place. In the mean- 
time should he exert himself to give us intelligence, he need only 
name the recompense, and most punctual attention shall be paid to 
it. The greatest secrecy will be observed on our parts; anything 
that in the end is to be made public will depend upon himself and 
as the method of communicating will be under your manage- 
ment, little danger can be apprehended. It being necessary to estab- 
lish a more frequent intercourse, I think your proposal for Bulkley 
to take any papers to Cable's and to be taken from his house by 
Knapp will be the best as attended with less danger. Should any- 
thing of great moment arise, we should hope you will take such 
method (which is left to your own prudence) to communicate it to us 
without loss of time, and tho' I would not have you risk yourself, 
yet where the end is great, your zeal will induce you to be a little less 
cautious than usual. I need not repeat that gratitude will prompt us 



* Mag-azhie of American History^ vol. xi, p. 346. 
t Commander in Chief. 



22 

to keep pace in our recompense to you, with the rewards given to 
our friend. 

I give jrou the general heads of what we could wish our friend 
should inform us of. 

ist. The State of the American Army. 

2d. The State of the French Army. 

3d. How each Army is situated. 

4th. What enterprize they mean to undertake, and the method of 
counteracting them. 

5th. What supplies and from whence they expect to subsist. 

6th. Where the magazines are, and how to be destroyed. 

7th. The movement of the French fleet and their intentions. 

8th. News from the Southward of consequence. 

gth. The situation of the different forts. 

loth. News from Europe. 

nth. The hopes of the ensuing campaign. 

12th. As much of the correspondence between General Washing- 
ton and the Congress as possible. 

The above are general heads. His own knowledge will point out 
any further information that may be of use, and I hope his zeal will 
make these communications frequent. 

As the endeavor of our friend may principally tend to promote a 
speedy reconciliation, at the end of the war he has ever to be 
assured that the gratitude of the Nation, which he has contributed 
to restore peace and happiness, will place him in the most honorable 
and lucrative situations. 

As it is necessary I should report to the C. in C. he will think 
the business in no great forwardness unless I could give him some 
marks of the sincerity of our friend's intentions. To you I leave the 
method of procuring it. 

With respect to the scheme of traffick, if you will point out the 
best method, every assistance shall be given. 

I must now request you will give me the fullest information on the 
margin of this letter, which will add to the many obligations j'ou have 

conferred on &c., &c., 

O. De L. 

ANSWERS. 

ist. It is my opinion that he does not wish to take an open and 
avowed part at present, however determined he may appear to be 
(and is really so) to communicate any material intelligence in his 
power, to inculcate principles of reconciliation, and detaching his sub- 
ordinate officers from French connection. I have no authority to say 
that he will give up any post or men committed to his care. This in 



23 

my opinion must depend upon future contingencies and the adverse 
turn their affairs are like to take; for were he sure that Independence 
would take place, his prospects as a General officer would be so great 
from the country, that they would outweigh every other considera- 
tion. 

I have frequently held up Arnold to his view, who (I observed) ac- 
quired the esteem, the countenance and protection of the Commander 
in Chief, the applause of his brother officers, and would in the end of 
the Nation in general, together with honour and emoluments, instead 
of Contempt. 

I have on a former occasion described the man to you, his local 
attachments, his scruples, his prejudices, and talents at intrigue; and, 
as he has already embarked half way, your own acquaintance with 
the human heart will enable you to judge whether it is not probable, 
that in time, he will go through the several gradations you would 
wish and expect of him. To effect this something generous ought to 
be given him in hand, but (in my opinion) not so much as I know he 
would ask. His expectations may be raised. It is for you to judge how 
much you Avould be willing to give at present, as an adequate reward 
for what I have given you reason to expect; and I find myself dis- 
posed to fall short, rather than raise your expectations, as I think it 
the more pardonable error of the two. Whatever you are willing to 
give, shall be my business to safe convey. The mode of conveyance 

thro' Bulkley, Cable and K p shall be punctually attended to, if 

you think it the most eligible; but since we conversed on the subject 
I have thought of a less expensive and equally safe (if not more so) 
method. It is this. The Refugees ought to be directed to make 
descents from Lloyd's Neck at certain periods, viz.: the ist and 15th 
of each month, on the shore adjacent to Bulkley's house, for the os- 
tensible purpose of destroying whale boats, driving off cattle, &c., as 
they could land in force, the small Rebel guards would be drove 
back into the country sufficiently remote from Bulkley's house, so as to 
give some prudent officer (whose business it ought to be made) an op- 
portunity of receiving from Bulkley the papers left with him. As the 
Refugees would conceive these little excursions to be in the line of 
their duty, no additional expense to the government would accrue. 
Perhaps I am mistaken. Should any event occur in the intermediate 
spaces of time which would require immediate notice to be given 
here, I would ride down to Knapp's and charge him with the delivery 
of it. Which of these modes of conveyance appears to you to be the 
most preferable, shall be attended to. The several heads from the ist 
to the 1 2th inclusive shall be attended to; but as I may not retain 
them, and it not being safe to carry such minutes out with me now, 
it will be best to send them out to Bulkley and order him to leave 
them at the usual place. They ought to be in cypher. I shall look 



24 

for them about the 28th inst. , and shall collect such intelligence (to 
convey back by the same hand) as I find are deserving notice. 

The necessity of our friend's giving me frequent and particular in- 
formation of every occurrence, in order to transmit them here shall 
be urged. 

Nothing shall be wanting on my part that may tend to beget in 
him a firm and perfect reliance on those offers you are pleased to 
authorize me to make. The ascendancy I have over him, the influ- 
ence I have over him, the confidence he has already reposed in me, 
the alluring prospect of Pecuniary, as well as honorary rewards, 
together with the plaudits of a grateful nation, shall all be combined 
together and placed in a conspicuous point of view, to engage him 
heartily in the cause. I know of no better method to tiy his sincerity 
than for him to select out of the foregoing heads, from the ist to the 
i2th, inclusive, such as he can immediately give proper and pre- 
cise answers to, and intrust me with the care of communicating 
them. In this service it would not be amiss for me to be able to tell 
what he may expect at present. I urge this to prevent his making an 
unreasonable and extravagant demand. 

As to the scheme of traffick, if I find it can be carried on without 
great danger, I shall point out to Mr. McNeill the method of carry- 
ing it into execution without any expense to the government. The 
danger attending it one side is greater now than when I first pre- 
pared it. To promote the real interest of my King and country, and 
to approve myself deserving the approbation of the C. in C. and you, 
shall be the constant objects of my attention. 

I am, &c., &c., 

W. H. 

15 July, 1781. 

* Sir— It is not my fault that you have not heard from me before 
now. I left two packets at the place appointed for Bulkley to take 
them; one of the 28th Ult", the other of the 4th Inst. "When I came 
to the place a second time I was surprised to find the first packet 
there; but more so now when I found both there unmoved. 

Soon after my return from New York, I had an interview with our 
frie7idy and after acquainting him of the nature of those services 
expected from him (at least as far as I could recollect the heads of 
the Queries you last showed me), we concerted measures for his con- 
veying to me every material article of intelligence. The enclosed is 
the first essay of the Kind, which serves to show the manner and the 
stile in which he is to write— as to a confidential friend, anxious to 
know those matters and occurrences, which in anywise affect the 
cause of the country. 



* Magazine o/ American History, vol. xii, p. 163. 



25 

One thing he said in the course of our conversation which convinces 
me that I am not deceived by him; that is, when he talked about his 
son,* he said, were he brought into New York, he wished that some 
provision may be made for him in the British Navy, to serve in 
Europe during the present contest. This is a fact which will enable 
you to judge of him for yourself. I expected to have been able to 
furnish him e'er this time with that paper you showed me last, con- 
taining the several heads of those matters to which you wished to 
have clear and explicit answer. He readily agreed to pay the strict- 
est attention to them. He will expect some money by me this time, 
but how to get it here I know not, as I would not wish to have any 
person besides yourself, or those you can confide in, made acquainted 
with anything of that nature. The bearer will acquaint you where 
I am concealed, but it is not a proper place for me to see anybody; 
not that I have anything to fear from the family, but from the 
Neighbors. 

I came here under the sanction of a commission from Gov. Trum- 
bull to cruise in the Sound. I am sorry I ever attempted to meddle 
with this plan of a commercial nature; this is the first essay, and I 
believe it will be the last. I entered upon it purely to draw in our 
friend; but I am sensible it is attended with more trouble and vexa- 
tion to you, as well as danger to me, than it can be of real advantage 
to me, otherwise than that I know it is serving the cause of govern- 
ment essentially. So thoroughly are our leaders on the other side 
convinced of the truth of this assertion that the severest laws are 
passed against it. I was at Mr. K p^ seasonable enough to ac- 
quaint you of the movement of troops to Kingsbridge, and of the 
French troops changing or shifting their first intended route for that 
purpose; but Mr. K p was not returned home then. 

The number of French troops is between 4 and 5000, and the late 
daily issues to the Continental army was about 7300 Rations. In this 
calculation the Staff, Artificers, Waggoners, &c., are included. This 
I had yesterday from a person in the issuing Commissary's Depart- 
ment. The Jersey and the New York line, which will amount to 
about 2300 men, are (I judge) by this time joined. West Point is to 
garrisoned by the militia. 

Should any money be sent to onr friend, it will be best to put it up 

in something like a belt. , o 

*» 1 am, &c., -^y jj 

P. S. — I thought it advisable to cut the name off the enclosed. 
Our friend manifested a wish that a cask of wine may be sent, 
however, I gave him not the least encouragement. 



* His son Enoch, who was born November 5, 1760, and was at this time 11 years and 8 
months old. 



26 

[Cop3' of a letter from G P, to W. H.] 

Camp, Phillipsburg, 

8th July, 17'Si. 

Dr. Sir — We have now taken a camp within about 12 miles of 
Kingsbridge, where I expect we shall continue until we know whether 
the states will in any considerable degree comply with the requisi- 
tions made of them, altho' we believe ourselves able to maintain our 
ground. You may easily conjecture what our future prospects are, 
when I assure you the five Regiments of our state are more than 1200 
men deficient of their complement; and the other States (except 
Rhode Island and New York, who are fuller) nearly in the same con- 
dition. 

The right of the front line is commanded by me, consisting of Con- 
necticut and Rhode Island troops; the left by General Lincoln, con- 
sisting of the brigades of Massachusetts. The 2d line, one brigade 
of Massachusetts and New Hampshire, commanded by General 
Howe. General McDougall commands at West Point. 

When the York forces join he will be relieved, which I expect will 
be soon, when I suppose he will take the right of the first line, and I 
shall be in the center; but this is uncertain. 

Our magazines are few in number, as well as very small; your fears 
for them are groundless. They are principally at West Point, Fish- 
kill, Wapping's Creek and Newburgh, which puts them out of the 
enemy's power, except they attempt their destruction by a force suffi- 
cient to secure the Highlands (which at present they cannot do), our 
guards at the magazines being sufficient to secure them from small 
parties. As the object of the Campaign is the reduction of New York, 
we shall now effectually try the patriotism of our countrj^men, who 
have always given us assurances of assistance when this should be- 
come the object. Of this I have had my doubts for several years, 
and wished it put to the test. 

The Minister of France is in Camp, and the French troops yester- 
day encamped on our left, near the Tuckeyhoe road. Their number 
I have not had opportunity to ascertain. 

The other matters of information you wish I shall be able to give 
you in a few days. The messenger waits. 

I am, 
D'- Sir, 

Y'- Obed' Serv't, 

[The signature cut out.] 

The editor of the Record of Private Intelligence, Mr. De Lancey, 
and— following him— .^///^/c7«'.y Cyclopedia of American Biography, 
find corroboration of the Record in sundry letters addressed to Major 



27 

John Kissam, in which Heron is mentioned, published by Henry G. 
Onderdonk, under the heading "Flags of Truce," in the Roslyn 
News, a Long Island newspaper. 

They are all dated in April, 1781, and they do confirm the Record 
in that they show that Heron was within the British lines at, or near, 
New York from the 21st to the 27th of April, 1781, but they do not 
confirm Heron's statements concerning General Parsons, who is 
mentioned, or referred to, in one of the Kissam letters only. This 
letter is as follows: 

Westbury, April 23, 1781. 

* Sir — I enclose a passport for Mr. Heron, and should wish for his 
return to Stamford whenever the wind will permit it. I have not yet 
received answer from New York, but as soon as those things wanted 
by General Parsons shall arrive, I will forward them to the General 
by another flag. 

I have the honor to be, with great regard, sir, 

Your most ob't, humble servant, 

L. J. A. De WURMB, 
L. Col. 

The postscript of a letter written by William Heron, dated New 
York, March 14, 1782, which is not included in Sir Henry Clinton's 
Record of Private Intelligence is evidence of importance. 

I have kept General P — s in a tolerable frame of mind since I had 
the pleasure of seeing you last, & altho' he was somewhat Chagrin'd 
when I returned from this place last October, yet I am convinc'd that 
in endeavoring to serve you he has (since) rendered himself in some 
measure unpopular. As you very well remember, I acquainted you 
with this Man's prevailing disposition and temper, and observ'd that 
altho' I believed him a rank Republican in principle, yet he was 
capable of serving you from other motives. The same Motives are 
still existing — and in Addition to them, disgust. Chagrin & disaffec- 
tion towards his Superiors come in as powerful Auxilliaries — his 
frustrating the expedition concerted by Tallmadge against Lloyd's 
Neck, his being an advocate for Loyal Subjects, and his being 
ready to Communicate whatever comes to his Knowledge of the 
Secrets of the Cabinet, are facts which are indisputable. Whether 
such services merit any reward, or whether a Man of principles can 
be Useful to you, is not for me to say. However, he has been 
encouraged to expect something, and, I suppose, can't be kept much 
longer in Countenance. For my own part, I consider myself bound 



* Magazine of American History, vol. xii, p. i68. 



28 

to persevere in discharging as far as my situation will admit of, those 
duties which I owe my sovreign & my Country.* 



This is the whole case against General Parsons. There is no 
question as to the genuineness of the Record of Private Intelligence, 
and the hundred years between its compilation and its discovery give 
the weight of age to its contents. It must be admitted that a first 
reading seems to leave no doubt that Parsons was disloyal to the 
government and people whose commission he held. The letter pur- 
porting to come from him was clearly enough an answer in part to 
the inquiries proposed by Major De Lancey. If General Parsons 
wrote it with a view of giving useful information to the enemy, by 
that act he became a dishonored man. 

But is Connecticut driven to break the image of another conspicu- 
ous officer of the army of the revolution ? Must Parsons be put in 
the same category with the brilliant soldier, who had he been mor- 
tally wounded by the bullet which laid him low at Quebec, or the 
shot that struck him at Saratoga would have been honored as a 
national hero, but whose odious name is to-day a synonym for 
treachery ? 

In answering this inquiry, I call your attention to the fact that the 
whole of the evidence against General Parsons rests upon letters 
or statements supplied by " Hiram" or "W. H." which stand for 
William Heron of Reading, Connecticut. 

For the letter of Lieutenant-colonel DeWurmb, to which the editor 
of the Record and Appletoti's Cyclopedia give importance, is an 
absolutely colorless paper, openly sent by one subordinate officer of 
the British army to another, and which especially provides that ' ' the 
things wanted by General Parsons," books, papers, clothing, they 
may have been, for prisoners within the American lines, are not 
to be forwarded through Heron, but by "another flag." The his- 
torian or biographer who could accept this letter as evidence of trea- 
son has betrayed a bias of mind which deprives his conclusions of 
value. Moreover, on the 23d of April, 1781, the date of this letter, 
Heron's first letter relating his interview with General Parsons, had 
not been written. 

It is important to know what manner of man Heron was. f He 
was a native of Cork, Ireland, born in 1742, who had been a 



* Magazine of American History, vol. xx, p. 351. 

+ It has been said of him generally that he was graduated at Trinity college, Dublin, 
but his name does not appear in the list of graduates. He married March 8, 1767, Mary 
Jennings. He died in 1819. 



29 

schoolmaster and a surveyor. At Reading he was generally known 
as Esquire Heron, and he represented the town in the General 
Assembly in 1778, '79. 'So, 81, '84, 'S5, '86, '87, '88, '89, '90, '95, '96, 
thirteen years. In 1777, the town o£ Reading chose him to act 
on a committee "to hire a number of Soldiers to serve in the 
Continental army." In 1779, the General Assembly appointed him 
one of a committee to inquire into, and estimate the losses of indi- 
viduals at Norwalk in consequence of the British invasion. In 1780, 
the same body appointed him a member of a committee to inquire 
into the conduct of persons employed in the department of the Quar- 
termaster General and the Commissary General with power of re- 
moval. 

Todd's History of Reading says, " In the revolution he sided with 
the King and was the recognized leader of the tories of Reading 
Ridge " [and that] " At the time of Tryon's invasion he openly gave 
aid and comfort to the enemy." But this is incredible. In 1776, the 
General Assembly prescribed an oath to be taken by its members 
and others, which included a declaration that " You believe in your 
conscience that the King of Great Britain hath not, nor of right ought 
to have, any authority or dominion in, or over, this State," and, 
" that you will, to the utmost of your power, maintain and defend the 
freedom, independence, and privileges of this State against all open 
enemies, or traitorous conspiracies whatsoever." An open tory could 
not have taken such an oath, nor could he have been appointed to 
the committees on which Heron served. The statement of Mr. Todd 
is evidently built upon a knowledge that Heron was engaged in a 
treasonable correspondence with the enemy, and an amplification of 
a story told him by "an aged person," that at the time of the inva- 
sion, Tryon and some of his officers, " were invited into Esquire 
Heron's, who lived in the first house south of the church, and enter- 
tained with cake and wine." If the story told by the aged person is 
true it is without significance. The wily Heron was looking out for 
the safety of his property. In 1781, Lund Washington, in charge of 
Mount Vernon, saved the property from ravage by furnishing the 
vessel which carried the marauding party with provisions. More- 
over, General James Robertson of the British army, at that time 
royal governor of the province of New York, communicated Septem- 
ber 21, 1780, to William Knox, one of his majesty's secretaries, a 
statement of the condition of affairs in America, made by Heron at 
New York, September 4, 1780. He says, referring to Heron, " He 
has had every opportunity he could desire to be acquainted with 
public affairs and especially of that colony. Till April last he was in 
the assembly, and a member for the County Correspondence, is now 
in office respecting the public accounts. He was an enemy to the 
Declaration of Independence, but he said little except to trusty 



30 



Loyalists. He stands well with the officers of the Continental army 
— with General Parsons he is intimate and is not suspected." 

Eliminate the extract from Todd's History of Reading and the re- 
mainder of the matter relating to Heron presents no difficulties. It is 
clear that he was a highly respected citizen, believed by his neigh- 
bors to be attached to the cause of the colonies. 

A letter of April 6, 1782, from Parsons to Washington makes a re- 
markable disclosure concerning him. The letter is as follows: 

* Dear General — When I was last with you, I forgot to mention 
the name of Mr. William Heron of Redding, who has for several years 
had opportunities of informing himself of the state of the enemy, 
their designs and intentions, with more certainty and precision than 
most men who have been employed. As I have left the service, I think 
it my duty to inform Your Excellency of this person and my reasons 
for believing him more capable of rendering service that way than 
most people are that may be employed if necessary. He is a native 
of Ireland, a man of very large knowledge, and a great share of nat- 
ural sagacity, united with a sound judgment, but of as unmeaning a 
countenance as any person in my acquaintance. With this appearance 
he is as little suspected as any man can be. An officer in the depart- 
ment of the adjutant general is a countryman and very intimate ac- 
quaintance of Mr. Heron, through which channel he has been able 
frequently to obtain important and very interesting intelligence. That 
he has had access to some of their secrets, a few facts will show be- 
yond doubt. Your Excellency will remember I informed you of the 
contents of a letter you wrote to Virginia, which was intercepted a 
year ago, but not published. This letter of his friend shows him of 
the descent made last year on New London. I was informed by him 
and made a written representation of it to the governor and council 
three days before it took place. This he had through the same chan- 
nel. He has frequently brought me the most accurate descriptions of 
the posts occupied by the enemy, and more rational accounts of their 
numbers, strength and designs than I have been able to obtain in 
any other way. 

As to his character, I know him to be a consistent, national Whig, 
he is always in the field on every alarm, and has in every trial proved 
himself a man of bravery. He has a family and a considerable inter- 
est in the state, and from the beginning of the war has invariably 
followed the measures of the country. I might add, as a circum- 
stance of his fidelity, his delivery of a letter from General Arnold to 
Major Andre to me, instead of leaving it where it was directed. 



* Magazine of American History, Vindication of Gen, S, H. Parsons, by George B. 
Loring, vol. xx, p. 293. 



31 

which letter you have. In opposition to this, his enemies suggest 
that he carries on illicit trade with the enemy, but I have lived two 
years the next door to him, and am fully convinced he has never had 
a single article of any kind for sale during that time, nor do I be- 
lieve he was, in the most distant manner, connected with com- 
merce at that time, or any subsequent period. I know many persons 
of more exalted character are also accused, none more than Governor 
Trumbull, nor with less reason. I believe the governor and Mr. 
Heron as clear of this business as I am, and I know myself to be totally 
free from everything which has the least connection with that com- 
merce. I think it my duty to give this full information of his char- 
acter, that if you should think it expedient to employ him, you might 
have some knowledge of the man, that you might be better able to 
satisfy yourself if you should send for him. I believe on conversa- 
tion he would give you entire satisfaction. I am, dear General, 

With the highest esteem. 

Your Excellency's ob't servant, 

SAMUEL H. PARSONS. 

In these facts derived from the public records, and in these letters, 
largely his own, we have the character of the man upon whose repre- 
sentations the whole case hinges. A tory in New York, a whig in 
Connecticut, on each side of the line he carried conviction of his sin- 
cerity. We find him capable of leaving a general assembly in which 
he had taken a solemn oath of fidelity to the state to betray its secret 
deliberations to a British officer : in his character as a tory at New 
York obtaining information from those he professed to serve to sell 
it to General Parsons, and to crown all, if his own representations 
are to be trusted, capable of entering upon a conspiracy to blast for- 
ever the fame of his intimate friend. He distributed his rascally 
favors apparently with an even hand, as indiif erent to results as lago, 

" Now whether he kill Cassio 
Or Cassio him, or each do kill the other. 
Every way makes my game." 

The spy who, inspired by patriotic feeling, obedient to duty, incurs 
the danger of ignominious death, men delight to honor; one, who, 
moved by pecuniary considerations alone, undertakes such service 
and faithfully carries out his contract may be entitled to respect. 
But this man purveyed news for both sides, deceived both sides, was 
paid by both sides. Major De Lancey, the British officer, wrote, " I 
need not repeat that gratitude will prompt us to keep pace in our 
recompense to you, with the rewards given to our friend." General 
Parsons' letter clearly implies that he also had paid him. As he 

3 



32 

pocketed his pay, no doubt he often chuckled, while his unmeaning 
countenance betraj'ed no sign, like lago again, 

" Thus do I ever make my fool my purse." 

What is the unsupported evidence of this witness worth ? It has 
substantially the value of the east wind as an article of diet. No 
man's reputation should be even smirched by the testimony of this 
liar and false swearer. 

The legal principle is substantially as follows : I quote from Rice 
on Evidence (vol. 3, p. 292.) The credibility of a witness may be 
" utterly annihilated" by disclosures " whereby the moral rottenness 
of the witness is exposed, the entire absence of moral sense of ac- 
countability, the strong presence of a dominating sense of personal 
gain or advantage." 

I might stop here, except that something should be said concern- 
ing the letter, purporting to come from General Parsons, transmitted 
to British headquarters. Now, the original not being in evidence, the 
only proof that it was written by Parsons is the statement of the dis- 
credited witness, Heron. The signature was cutoff. Why should the 
signature, if genuine, of a letter, which on its face was innocent, have 
been removed? The signature disclosed nothing, for the identity of 
the writer was revealed by the body of the letter. The reason is not 
hard to find. The signature of General Parsons must have been 
well known at British headquarters, and the removal of the name 
stamps the letter as a fraud concocted by Heron, who cut off the sig- 
nature to lessen the likelihood of its detection. This theory seems 
to me in full accord with all the facts, but there is another, not with- 
out support, which is also consistent with the integrity of Parsons. 

In the spring of 1781, Cornwallis was in Virginia at the head of 
7000 effective men, and with scarcely one-third of that number to 
oppose him. Lacking command of the sea, the fleet of De Grasse 
being then in the West Indies, Washington and Rochambeau agreed 
that the measure most likely to afford relief to the southern states 
would be a serious demonstration against New York. Washington 
wrote Jefferson June 8, 1781, "The prospect of giving relief to the 
southern states by an operation in this quarter (New York) was the 
principal inducement for undertaking it." Washington desired 
Clinton to apprehend an attack on New York, for relief of the south- 
ern states by this method could be made effective only by leading 
Clinton to strengthen his own position by withdrawing troops from 
the south. The plan worked well. You will remember that in June 
Clinton ordered Cornwallis to send back to New York, three thousand 
men. Bancroft says, "Deceived by letters that were written to be 
intercepted, he [Clinton] believed that the enemy would certainly 
attack that post " [New York]. Now, the only information in the 



33 

Parsons letter which Clinton might not have obtained easily from 
other sources is to be found in the incidental remark, "As the object 
of the campaign is the reduction of New York." An American 
officer, high in command, might be supposed to know the real 
purposes of Washington. It is possible that Parsons may have 
written the letter on lines suggested by his spy Heron, expressly to 
fall into the hands of Clinton with the laudable wish to further 
Washington's plan of campaign. 

In the absence of a witness more trustworthy than Heron, what 
actually took place in the matter which has occupied our attention 
this evening must remain unknown. But the true story, per- 
haps, is not far from this : In September, 1779, Lord George Ger- 
main wrote Sir Henry Clinton, "Next to the destruction of Wash- 
ington's army, the gaining over of officers of influence and reputation 
among the troops would be the speediest means of subduing the 
rebellion and restoring the tranquillity of America. Your commis- 
sion authorizes you to avail yourself of such opportunities, and the 
expense will be cheerfully submitted to."* Now Heron had in- 
formed the British headquarters that he was intimate with Parsons. 
Here, then, was a rare opportunity for Clinton to carry out the 
instructions of the home office. A royalist at heart, already in his 
pay, who was also the intimate friend of a rebel general of character 
and influence, was at hand for his purposes. The subject was 
broached to the crafty Heron, who jumped at the scheme. Although 
his plan to make it profitable may have been confused at first, it was 
soon worked out, and after this fashion : First, make Clinton believe 
that Parsons is purchasable; second, convince him that Parsons has 
yielded to temptation; third, become the intermediary through whom 
the compensation is made. It involved little risk. Parsons need 
know nothing about it, and with a fraction of a fair price for a likely 
major general safely laid away in the Heron family treasury, he could 
afford to retire from the practice of his profession as a spy. From his 
retreat at Reading Ridge, when the fraud should be discovered, he 
could safely ask Sir Henry Clinton, " What are you going to do about 
it? " Sir Henry's mouth would have been closed. You have observed 
how frequently he brought the matter of compensation to the atten- 
tion of Major De Lancey. June 20, " Something generous should be 
given him in hand." .... " Whatever you are willing to give, 
shall be my business to safe convey." Again in the same paper, " It 
would not be amiss for me to be able to tell what he may expect at 
present." July 15, " He will expect some money by me this time." 
Again in the same letter, "Should any money be sent to our friend, 
it will be be best to put it up in something like a belt." It is rather 



*Bancro/t^s History of the United States, vol. 3, p. 42S, 



I » > 



34 

gratifying to find that Heron's game was not successful. Eight 
months later, in March, 1782, he wrote : "He has been encouraged to 
expect something, and I suppose can't be kept much longer in coun- 
tenance." At this time nearly eleven months had elapsed since 
Heron reported favorable progress with Parsons, but he had been 
able to get nothing on Parsons' account. And why ? Clinton was in 
the market for rebel generals, and was authorized to pay for them. 
If the proofs that Parsons had yielded to temptation had been forth- 
coming, the money would have been forthcoming also, without doubt. 
If Parsons had been guilty, there could have been no trouble about 
the proofs. Precisely that happened which should have happened if 
he were free from taint. 

The brazen mendacity of Heron and the strait in which he found 
himself when he wanted proofs that Parsons had rendered service to 
the British are well illustrated in the letter of March 14, 1782, in 
which he mentions " his [Parsons] frustrating the expedition con- 
certed by Tallmadge against Lloyd's Neck." Now the only expedi- 
tion projected by Tallmadge against Lloyd's Neck, between the time 
when Heron, according to his own statement, made the first corrupt 
proposition to Parsons, and the date of this letter, was projected in 
April, 1781. Tallmadge, in his memoir says that he "informed 
"Washington that by the aid of a small naval force, say two frigates, the 
Sound could be cleared, and with his permission, I would take my 
own detachment and such additional force as he should judge neces- 
sary and break up their establishment at Lloyd's Neck of about 800 
men, and Fort Slongo of about 150 men." General Washington fur- 
nished him with a letter to Rochambeau, by whom he was well 
received, but, these are his words, " The absence of the smaller 
ships of the \^FrencK\ squadron on special service prevented the 
execution of the plan.''* Lacking entirely proof that Parsons had 
rendered military service to the British, Heron followed his custom- 
tomary method and invented some. 

Samuel Holden Parsons was a man of character by inheritance, a 
believer in independence three years before the declaration, a pro- 
jector of the continental congress, a soldier in the field from the first 
clash of arms until after the surrender at Yorktown, and was called by 
his countrymen during twenty-one of the fifty-two years which he 
lived to important military and civil stations. The waters of the Big 
Beaver closing over him made vacant a seat upon the bench. 

William Heron was a professional spy, he swore falsely in the gen- 
eral assembly, betrayed his employers on both sides, and by his own 
statement was engaged in a scheme either to rob a British officer of 
his gold or his intimate friend of his honor. Parsons knew him as 



*Memotrs of Col. Benj. Tallmadge, by himself. 



35 

whig, Clinton knew him as a tory, we know him as a liar. The 
unsupported testimony of such a witness against any man, where 
deflection from the truth could be of advantage, should not have a 
pin's weight. 

On the evidence of this man, when it is considered that the only 
one of his statements reflecting upon Parsons which can be tested — 
that relating to the expedition against Lloyd's Neck — is shown to be 
untrue; that lying in this case offered promise of gain; that the 
plausible rascal was never able to make Clinton believe that his cor- 
rupt proposals had been accepted by Parsons; to brand this gallant 
officer and respected magistrate a British spy, is an act of monstrous 
injustice. 




A VINDICATION OF GENERAL ISRAEL 

PUTNAM. 

[Contributed to the Hartford Post by Jonathan Trumbull.] 

A Striking instance of the base uses to which even a minor heathen 
deity may be turned in our day and generation is to be found in the 
spectacle of Capt. T. J. Mackey insisting that "the muse of history 
must weep " over the statue of Gen. Israel Putnam " in front of the 
state house at Hartford," which statue Captain Mackey characterizes 
as " a monumental lie in bronze." His confidence in the suscepti- 
bility of the muse of history to the hypnotic influence of historical 
misstatements appears to be his only reason for expecting her to 
weep at his command; for through the medium of the Peterson 
Magazine, in a serial life of Washington, commencing with the June 
number and ending with the December number in 1895, he charges 
Putnam with "flagrant derelictions of duty," with cowardice and 
active participation in the Conway cabal, remarking that, on various 
occasions, his conduct "bore the ear-marks of studied treachery; " all 
of which will, he says, be " shown" or " attested by clearest proofs." 

This promised demonstration of these serious charges is, however, 
conspicuous by its absence; for Putnam's accuser omits to cite a 
single authority for his statements and appears to rely on a certain 
childlike faith on the part of his readers, which will be satisfied with 
the assurance that if you see it in the Peterson Magazine it's so. 

But, seriously, does not a writer assume a graver responsibility 
in attacking the reputation of a man who has always been regarded 
as one of the heroes of the American Revolution, than in attacking 
the reputation of a man who is living and can defend himself? 
Were it not for the fact that these unproved and unfounded 
charges will be and have been read by hundreds who may take them 
as authoritative, we might let them pass in the full belief that they 
will live a short and noxious life which the chemistry of nature will 
soon annihilate. But, as a certain amount of mischief may be done 
by them, it is best to investigate and, so far as our sources of infor- 
mation will allow, to confront them with recorded facts. 

The first charge against Putnam is in connection with his command 
at Cambridge in November, 1775, and refers to the demand of two 



37 

Connecticut regiments for their discharge, on the ground that their 
term of enlistment had expired. Regarding this circumstance the 
author says : 

Despite every appeal to their patriotism they refused to re-enlist and left for their 
homes in a body three days before their term of enlistment expired, carrying off their mus- 
kets and ammunition, which were public property. They belonged to the command of 
General Israel Putnam, an officer who, it will be shown, in after years brought bitter dis- 
aster to the American army by his flagrant derelictions of duty, and he failed to report the 
facts in time for Washington to intercept the deserters. 

Will Captain Mackey please to "show" or attest "by clearest 
proofs," as he promises to do : 

That two Connecticut regiments, or about 1,500 men, " left for their 
homes in a body," at the time he refers to. 

That their arms and ammunition were " public property." 

That Putman failed to report the facts to Washington at the proper 
time. 

The evidence at our command points to an entirely different state 
of affairs. In the first place, let us look at Washington's own state- 
ment regarding this matter; a statement which appears, singularly 
enough, to be utterly ignored by his enthusiastic biographer. In 
writing to Governor Trumbull regarding the Connecticut men who 
left the army at this time, Washington says, over his own signature : 

Many of them went off, and though the utmost vigilance and industry were used to 
apprehend them, several got away with their arms and ammunition. 

It thus seems that the two regiments which, according to Captain 
Mackey's statement, " left for their homes in a body," were, accord- 
ing to the contemporary statement of Washington, " several" men, 
who, under Captain Mackey's manipulation appear to have increased 
and multiplied even in larger arithmetical proportion than the men 
in buckram of whom the redoubtable Jack Falstaff discourses. 

In order still further to magnify the enormity of Putnam's alleged 
negligence and its consequences, it appears necessary to his accuser 
to make the statement that these two mythical regiments carried 
with them their arms and ammunition which were "public property," 
or in other words, that those men stole from the American army about 
1,500 muskets and corresponding ammunition, at a time when they 
were sorely needed; for all of which Putnam is held responsible. The 
act of the general assembly of Connecticut under which these men 
enlisted contemplated that they should furnish their own arms, for 
the use of which they were to be paid, and that only in case of fail- 
ure to furnish their own arms should they be provided by the colony. 
{Public Records of the Colony of Connectz'cttt, vol. 14, p. 41S. Subse- 
quent legislation in the May session of 1775 also provided for payment 
for ammunition furnished by enlisted men. This custom was continued 



38 

in recruiting by Washington himself, as appears by his general or- 
ders of January 20, 1776. In view of these facts, we may, with par- 
donable curiosity, inquire by what means it is discovered at this late 
day that the arms and ammunition in question were ' ' public prop- 
erty." 

When we confront the statement that Putnam failed to report the 
facts in time for Washington "to intercept the deserters," with 
Washington's own statement that "the utmost vigilance and in- 
dustry were used to apprehend them," we need hardly go further. 
But it is as well to cite the fact that, in the same communication, 
Washington says that it had already been discovered that these men 
" were uneasy to leave the service and determined upon it," and that 
a council of war had been called during the previous week to take ac- 
tion upon this very matter. And if Washington himself was half 
as much impressed with Putnam's alleged negligence in this matter 
as his more modern accuser appears to be, it is simply inexplicable 
that he should have made the following mention of Putnam in a let- 
ter to the president of congress on the 30th of January, 1776, after 
having had two months in which to meditate on Putnam's conduct in 
this matter : 

' ' General Putnam is a most valuable man and a fine executive 
officer." 

So, in this first charge made against Putnam, there is left to the 
author the responsibility, not only of producing proofs, but of 
explaining away recorded facts. 

His confidence in Putnam's ability led Washington to appoint him 
to the command of the forces at Brooklyn Heights and the vicinity, 
in the emergency occasioned by the severe illness of General Greene, 
who had been occupied during the summer of 1776 in fortifying this 
important position, and who was of course as thoroughly familiar as 
Putnam was unfamiliar with the position. At the time when Putnam 
assumed this command the British force of 20,000 veteran troops, 
under command of the ablest generals of the British army, had 
already landed at Gravesend and had spent two days in reconnoiter- 
ing the position. To oppose their advance towards the fortifications 
on Brooklyn Heights, Putnam had at his disposal about 5,000 raw 
recruits, for whose movements in repelling an advance Washington 
issued specific official orders in writing on the 25th, and in person on 
the 26th of August, the day before the battle. The advance of the 
British was possible by four different roads over a space about three 
miles wide, and through a country offering, from its tory inhab- 
itants, every facility for effecting their purpose. 

For the inevitable defeat of this forlorn hope of repelling this 
advance by a force of undisciplined troops, one-fourth the number of 
their disciplined enemy. General Putnam is held solely responsible 



39 

by Captain Mackey, and by nobody else, so far as we can ascertain. 
Though Putnam needs no further defense against the attacks of his 
accuser in this instance than the circumstances just outlined afford, 
let us examine a little of the documentary. evidence which naturally 
attaches to these charges, and which appears to be utterly disre- 
garded or wilfully misconstrued by Putnam's accuser. 

We find we must begin by calling on Captain Mackey for evidence 
to prove his statement that Putnam " claimed the right " to command 
at Long Island. That he had a perfect right to this claim we do not 
dispute; but we have searched in vain for any evidence that he 
asserted it. All this would be unimportant were it not for the fact 
that it is also stated that Putnam's "whole conduct at Long Island 
and subsequently in the Highlands, bore the ear-marks of studied 
treachery," the inference which the indulgent reader is expected to 
draw being, no doubt, that he claimed the command at Long Island 
in order to betray the American forces. In pursuance of this view 
of the case, we find it stated at the outset that upon assuming the 
command at Long Island, "he at once proceeded to organize defeat 
for the American army." The specifications of these charges are 
that General Sullivan, who had a perfect knowledge of the country, 
was posted within the lines and that General Stirling, who was 
unfamiliar with the country, was stationed beyond them; that the 
troops were withdrawn from the wooded heights commanding the 
passes towards Brooklyn and that Sullivan's mounted patrols were 
forbidden to go beyond the passes. 

The battle of Long Island was fought on the 27th of August, 1776, 
commencing at an early hour in the morning. Washington was on 
the ground on the 24th and the following day issued these orders to 
Putnam upon the subject of repelling an advance of the British: 

"The militia, or the most indifferent troops (those I mean least 
tutored and seen least service) will do for the interior work, whilst 
your best men should at all hazards prevent the enemy's passing the 
wood and approaching your works." 

These orders were followed by another visit from Washington on 
the 26th, when he " continued till evening," according to the official 
report of his secretary. Colonel Harrison, for no other purpose than 
to arrange for the battle, which, according to the same official report, 
he saw was impending. In further confirmation, we find on the same 
day that the Maryland and Delaware troops which composed part of 
Lord Stirling's brigade were ordered over from New York by Wash- 
ington's direction. In full view of these very plain orders of Wash- 
ington and of the precision with which they were executed by Put- 
nam, his accuser remarks that, " Putnam's plain duty [on the first 
alarm of the approach of the enemy] was to man his breastworks, to 
have every soldier at his post and await daylight," while he was 



40 

under written orders from Washington directing that his ' ' best men 
should at all hazards prevent the enemy's passing the wood and ap- 
proaching " his works. 

A glance at any reliable map, and even a superficial reading of 
any reliable account of the battle, will show that it was upon the 
wooded heights commanding the passes to Brooklyn that the Ameri- 
can troops were posted, and that the advance of the British was con- 
tested; and yet we are told that the troops were withdrawn from 
these very heights. We are also informed that the patrols which had 
been employed by Sullivan were withdrawn by Putnam's orders, for 
which statement we must ask for authority which shall dispose of 
H. P. Johnson's statement in vol. 3 of the Memoirs of the Long Island 
Historical Society, which asserts that " on the night of the 26th Sul- 
livan exercised the same authority he had exercised in making other 
details and sent out a special patrol of five commissioned officers to 
watch the Jamaica pass." Documents are quoted in support of this 
statement. Fiske's statement that these patrols were captured on 
the morning of the 27th must also be disposed of. 

The fact appears to be that Sullivan, who, as Washington once 
plainly told him, was one of the most notorious malcontents among 
the respectable American generals of his day, sent to congress, more 
than a year later, his own version of his share in this battle, in which 
he mentions his own foresight regarding the Jamaica road and makes 
the singular confession that, instead of massing his entire force to 
repel the expected advance of the enemy by this road, he went for- 
ward with a " picket of 400," to reconnoitre and was surrounded by 
the enemy and obliged to surrender. It thus appears, by Sullivan's 
own showing, that he had been placed in command of a position 
regarding which he had professed the greatest knowledge and fore- 
sight and that the exercise of this foresight prevented him from 
making use of more than 400 men of his brigade, while Stirling, who, 
according to Captain Mackey's opinion, should have changed positions 
with Sullivan, made the best possible use of his entire brigade and 
did practically all the fighting that was done in the battle. 

The statistics at the command of Putnam's accuser are as surpris- 
ing and as well adapted to his purpose as his unsupported account 
of the military situation. In summing up the results, he says : 
" The American loss at the battle of Long Island was not less than 
3,000 and thus each star upon the coat collar of Major General Putnam 
had cost the continental army 1,000 brave soldiers." 

By this sudden and convenient transformation of the figures of 
arithmetic into a figure of speech the dazzled reader is expected to 
draw the inference that 3,000 soldiers of the continental army were 
killed at the battle of Long Island and that Putnam was responsible 
for the "loss" of each and every one of them. Once more it must 



41 

be remarked that Washington's enthusiastic biographer has, appar- 
ently, no use for Washington's own statement of facts and that, in 
this instance, he sees fit to discredit the great and glorious chieftain 
by disregarding his statements and by making convenient use of the 
unreliable statements of his enemy. General Howe, hardly recovered 
from the flush of victory, and with the attraction of a possible red 
ribbon of a K. C. B. before his eyes, certainly does say, in his official 
report of September 3, that the American loss is "computed at about 
3,300 killed, wounded, prisoners and missing." Sixteen days later, 
Washington writes to the Massachusetts assembly that "we lost 
about 800 men, more than three-fourths of which were taken pris- 
oners." And yet Putnam's accuser seizes on a report made by the 
British commander at a time when accuracy was out of the question 
and utterly ignores the report of the American commander at a time 
when accuracy was as well assured as possible, all of which is done 
apparently for no other purpose than to reach convenient arithmetical 
results suited to his purpose. 

There is scarcely a doubt that Washington himself saw that the 
result of the advance of the British on Brooklyn Heights would be a 
defeat of the American forces and that his only hope was to make 
this defeat as costly as possible to the enemy. And there is no 
doubt whatever that Washington himself assumed the responsibility 
of the plan of defense, as appears by documents already quoted and 
by his letter of March 16, 1777, to the malcontent Sullivan, in which 
he writes: 

" And what kind of a separate command had General Putnam at New York ? I have 
never heard of any, except his commanding there ten days before my arrival from Boston 
and one day after I had left it for Harlem Heights, as senior officer." 

It must be confessed that the task of confronting Captain Mack- 
ey's charges with the documentary evidence which applies to them 
has already become monotonous in its results. Having dealt in 
detail with the most important of these charges, I will pass, not for 
lack of evidence but for lack of variety, more hastily over the 
remaining charges. 

For startling dramatic effect, all of Captain Mackey's historical feats 
are eclipsed by the wonderful scene in which, contrary to all other 
known authority, he mentions the disgraceful affair of Kipp's Bay 
and the battle of Harlem Heights as occurring on the same day and 
accuses Putnam of negligence of duty in the first instance and of 
cowardice in the second. Some supernatural faculty also enables Cap- 
tain Mackey to determine the fact that Putnam, with a sole view to his 
personal safety, kept beyond the range of the fire of the British at 
Harlem. This being the case, how shall we dispose of General 
Nathaniel Greene's report of Putnam's conduct at Harlem, in a let- 



42 

ter to Governor Cooke, dated Sept. 17, 1776, the day after the battle, 
in which report we read : 

The fire continued about an hour and the enemy retreated ; our people pursued 
them ; and by the spirited conduct of General Putnam and Colonel Reed, the adjutant 
general, our people advanced upon the plain without cover and attacked and drove them 
back. 

Since the burden of proof rests with the accuser, and since our 
efforts to relieve him of that burden have, thus far, only added to it, 
we will, in closing, content ourselves with challenging the following 
statements and demanding proof of them : 

That Putnam was an active participator in the Conway cabal. 

That he was ordered to join Washington at the battle of Trenton. 

That he had 2,400 good troops at his disposal with which he could 
reinforce Washington at that battle. 

In order to establish proofs of these statements it will be necessary 
also to prove that Putnam was not under orders to hold Philadelphia 
at all hazards, and that he did not assist most effectively by diverting 
the attention of the British on this occasion by an advance of about 
500 men under Colonel Griffin. 

I prefer to leave this plain statement as it stands, without any fur- 
ther expressions of opinion regarding the motives which may have 
prompted this attack on the memory of a man of whom it is truly 
recorded that "he dared to lead where any dared to follow." It 
must be added, however, that this attack forms another instance of 
the modern fashion of defaming revolutionary patriots; and the most 
flagrant instance which has come to my notice. 









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